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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: NATURE, SCOPE
AND TYPES
ROBERT SHERIFFS MOSS *
NATURE AND SCOPE GENERALLY
In theory, the United States steps down from its sovereign posi-
tion when it contracts with its citizens for property and services. When
it does so, it has been said, it must be treated, in general, as are other
private contractors under analogous situations.' In theory, also, "the
United States being a body politic, may, within the sphere of the
constitutional powers confided to it, and through the instrumentality
of the proper department to which those powers are confided, enter into
contracts not prohibited by law, and appropriate to the just exercise
of those powers." 2
 Similarly, the United States enjoys the unrestricted
power to produce its own supplies, to determine with whom it will deal
and to fix the terms and conditions upon which it will make needed
purchases 3
It necessarily follows, therefore, that if the constitutional powers
are confided to a department or agency of the government, "that the
duty, and of course the right, to make contracts may flow from an act
of congress, which does not in terms prescribe this duty; ... that there
is a power to contract in every case where it is necessary to the execu-
tion of a public duty."' The actual existence of this right and
authority to contract is always open to inquiry, and if found wanting
or forbidden by statutes or otherwise, the contract is not binding on
the government. 5
 Hence there can never be any apparent authority of
a government officer or agent (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"contracting officer") to contract, and private citizens contract with
* Member of the Bars of the State of Wisconsin and the District of Columbia;
member of firm of Hart, Moss & Tavenner, District of Columbia.
This article is limited to the nature and scope of government contracts and the
types thereof employed by the military departments and the other agencies subject
to the Armed Services Procurement Act or the Federal Procurement Act. No effort has
been made to discuss personal service contracts, research and development contracts,
contracts for the sale of government property or the special types of contracts and
contracting authority of special agencies, government corporations, the Veterans
Administration and the Department of Agriculture.
1 United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106 (1944); I McBride &
Wachtel, Government Contracts § 1.20 (1963).
2 United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 114, 128 (1831). See also, Jessup v.
United States, 106 U.S. 147 (1882); United States v. Maurice, 26 Fed. Cas. 1211 (No.
15,747) (C.C.D. Va. 1823); United States v. Salon, 182 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1950); I Mc-
Bride & Wachtel, Government Contracts § 1.10 (1963).
3 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
4 United States v. Maurice, supra note 2, at 1217; 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 26 (1853).
5 Whiteside v. United States, 93 U.S. 247 (1876); The Floyd Acceptances, 75 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 666 (1868).
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them at their peril.° Similarly, no contracting officer has implied
authority to amend or modify a contract without consideration, as to
do so would not be in the government's interest.'
One of the apparent prohibitions against exercise of contracting
authority solely on the basis of implied authority is to be found in
Article 1, Section 9, of the Constitution. This section prohibits with-
drawal of moneys from the Treasury except in consequence of ap-
propriations made by law. However, this section has been construed
as a mere limitation and restriction upon the executive officers of the
Treasury Department, and does not prevent enactment of legislation
by Congress, either specifically or by implication, authorizing the
creation of contractual obligations.8 Thus, if Congress appropriates
funds for a specific object, this constitutes implied authority to contract
within the limitation of the appropriation.° On the other hand, if the
Constitution or any statute authorizes and requires the president
or any officer or agent to create a contractual obligation, the legality
is wholly independent of an appropriation and a lawful contractual
obligation may result, the payment of which, however, must await an
appropriation."
Accordingly, it would appear that government officers and agents
have, theoretically, a substantial amount of contractual authority by
implication, stemming from Congressional designations of Constitu-
tional authority, or from appropriations, in addition to specific con-
tracting authority which may be granted in advance of Congressional
appropriations." The extent of this implied authority has never been
fully developed. Congress has chosen to use a different approach. It
would seem, however, that having the implied authority, almost any
kind of contract, which was not contrary to the public interest,
tainted with fraud or other illegality or prohibited by law, could be
used by officers and agents of the United States in the exercise of such
implied authority."
6 Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279 (1902) ; Whiteside V.
United States, 93 U.S. 247 (1876) ; Filor v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 45 (1869) ;
Lee v. Munroe, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813). Cf. Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S.
575 (1921) ; I McBride & Wachtel, Government Contracts § 5.10(4) (1963).
7 American Sales Corp. v. United States, 32 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S.
574 (1929).
8 Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 271 (1850) ; Mitchell v. United States, 18
Ct. Cl. 281, rev'd, 109 U.S. 146 (1883) ; 6 Ops. Att'y Gen. 26 (1853).
9 Mitchell v. United States, supra note 8; 30 Ops. Att'y Gen. 186 (1913) ; 6 Ops.
Att'y Gen. 26 (1853).
10 Ibid.
11 30 Ops. Att'y Gen. 147 (1913).
12 E.g., Cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract approved in United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942). Note, however, that 60 Stat. 809 (1946),
as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) ; 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1958) ; and 63 Stat. 395 (1949), as
amended, 41 U.S.C. § 254(b) (1958) prohibit the use of this type of contract.
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However, as government contracting increased during both war
and peacetime and as attention was focused on the powers of con-
tracting officers and alleged abuses of such powers, Congress has tended
to limit and define the powers of contracting officers. A myriad of
legislative enactments has resulted; most of which, prior to 1947, seem
to have been enacted without any particular plan or pattern, being
designed to deal with or resolve the problems of the moment. Much of
the legislation adopted governs the use of contractual provisions, the
form of which is specified by the statute." Many of these, while they
require contractual action by the contracting officer, and are mandatory
for use in government contracts within the requirements of the statute,
represent an effort on the part of Congress to impose upon government
contractors moral, social or economic concepts of the time."
The earliest of these enactments took the form of limitation on the
implied authority of government contracting officers. For example:
(1) the prohibition of the purchase of land, except under a law specifi-
cally authorizing such purchase:" (2) the prohibition against the
making of a contract unless authorized by law or under an appropria-
tion adequate to its fulfillment; 18
 (3) the requirement that all pur-
chases and contracts for supplies and services be made or entered into
only after formal advertising for bids, with an award to the lowest
responsible bidder," (4) the prohibition against the making of con-
tracts for stationery or other supplies for a period longer than one
year," (5) the prohibition of contracts for the erection, repair, or
furnishing of any public building or improvement thereon, in excess
of the amount specifically appropriated for the purpose," (6) the
13 E.g., 49 Stat. 2036 (1936), as amended, 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1958), requiring
contract representations and warranties in contracts over $10,000 for manufacturing
or furnishing materials, supplies, articles and equipment, that the contractor is a regular
manufacturer or dealer, that employees will be paid minimum wages and will not work
in excess of specified maximum hours and that sweat-shop conditions will not exist; 60
Stat. 37 (1946), 41 U.S.C. § 51 (1958), prohibiting the payment of fees or kick-backs by
subcontractors on negotiated contracts and providing for the recovery thereof; 76 Stat.
357 (1962), 40 U.S.C. § 328 (Supp. IV, 1959-62), requiring the payment of overtime
on public works contracts; 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1958) and 63 Stat. 395 (1949), as amended,
41 U.S.C. § 254 (1958), prohibiting the payment of contingent fees for obtaining
contracts except for bona fide employees or established commercial or selling agencies;
Rev. Stat. § 3741 (1875), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 22 (1958), providing for the
insertion of the so-called "officials not to benefit" provision in all government contracts;
47 Stat. 1520 (1933): 41 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)-(b) (1958), The Buy American Act, requiring
the use of American materials.
14 Note the social, moral and economic aspects of the required clauses referred to
in note 13, supra.
13 Rev. Stat. § 3736 (1875), 41 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
16 Rev. Stat. § 3732 (1875), 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1958). Note that this excepts Army,
Navy and Air Force contracts for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, transporta-
tion or medical and hospital supplies to the extent of the necessities of the current year.
17 Rev. Stat. § 3709 (1875), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1958).
is Rev. Stat. § 3735 (1875), 41 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
19 Rev. Stat. § 3733 (1875), 41 U.S.C. § 12 (1958).
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provision that no appropriation act should be construed to authorize
the execution of a contract involving the payment of money in excess
of appropriations made by law, unless so declared in specific terms;"
and (7) the authorization of the use of annual appropriations in the
fiscal year involved, the balances to be applied only to the payment
of expenses properly incurred during that year or to the fulfillment of
contracts properly made during that year. 21 In 1874, by statute, all un-
expended balances of appropriations, even though obligated, were to be
carried to the surplus fund and covered into the Treasury after the
elapse of two years following the close of the fiscal year for which the
funds were appropriated." Most of these enactments, as well as other
enactments defining or limiting the contracting authority of govern-
ment officers or agents, contained exceptions, either written into the
statute originally or from time to time after enactment, as the various
branches of the executive departments sought and were granted excep-
tions or special statutory treatment." A careful study of the Con-
gressional enactments with reference to government contracting
presents a picture of Congress periodically limiting, granting, cir-
cumscribing, defining and redefining contract authority. This activity
has, of course, increased over the years, and with the establishment of
the General Accounting Office in 1921 24 which has (1) general powers
over claims of and against the United States; 25 (2) audit and super-
visory functions over the determination of the propriety and legality
of the obligation and expenditure of appropriated funds,' and (3) the
duty to report to the Congress, as a part of the legislative branch of
the government, concerning the exercise of contracting authority and
the expenditure of appropriated funds," it is an unusual session of
Congress, today, which does not enact at least one piece of legislation
with reference to government contracts. 28
25 34 Stat. 764 (1906), 31 U.S.C. § 627 (1958).
27 Rev. Stat. § 3690 (1875); 18 Stat. 110 (1874). 63 Stat. 407 (1949), 31 U.S.C.
§§ 712(a)-(b) (1958); 63 Stat. 358, 31 U.S.C. § 712(c) (1958); 18 Stat. 418 (1875), 31
U.S.C. § 713(a) (1958) and Rev. Stat. § 3691 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 715 (1958) provide a
system of carrying expended balances to a certified claims fund. The reader should
also examine all of Title 31, which provides methods of allocation of appropriations and
provides penalties for contracting in excess of appropriations.
22 18 Stat. 110 (1874).
23 See note material following applicable sections of 31 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.,
indicating exceptions to be found in other parts of the United States Code. Note
particularly the exceptions listed at 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1958) "Cross References."
24 42 Stat. 63 (1921), 31 U.S.C. §§ 41-60 (1958).
25 Rev, Stat. § 236 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 71 (1958).
26 31 U.S.C. §§ 65-134 (1958).
27 42 Stat. 25 (1921), 31 U.S.C. § 53 (1958). See also, 45 Stat. 413 (1928), 31
U.S.C. § 236 (1958), which provides for the reporting to Congress of meritorious
claims which cannot be adjusted lawfully.
28 E.g., 76 Stat. 357, 40 U.S.C. §§ 328-332 (Supp. IV, 1959-62); Contract Work
Hours Standard Act, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV, 1959-62); 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (Supp.
IV, 1959-62).
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The formal advertising concept of Section 3709 of the Revised
Statutes' has survived the passage of time. It is today recognized as
the cornerstone of government procurement policy," although Con-
gress has enacted a number of permanent exceptions. Prior to the
adoption of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947, Congress
had not been persuaded that permanent exceptions to the formal
advertising concept were necessary. During World War I, Congress
gave the president" extraordinary contracting powers, including the
power to negotiate certain contracts. This power was delegated to
contracting agencies and numerous contracts were negotiated during
World War I. One of the types of negotiated contracts used was the
cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract. Under this type of contract,
the contractor received all of his costs expended in the performance of
the contract plus a percentage of such costs as profit. After World
War I had ended, the government attempted to disavow some of these
contracts on the ground, inter cilia, that the profits were unconscionable.
In one case it was alleged that the contractor was a war profiteer; the
evil lying in the fact that the greater the cost the greater the profit, and
that the government had no control over the cost.' In that case, the
Supreme Court in 1942, some 23 years after the end of the war, held
that there was no illegality in the contracts, and suggested that if there
was an evil in the system it could be prohibited only by Congress.
Congress had anticipated the Court's suggestion. In 1940, in con-
nection with an authorization to the Secretary of War" to acquire
property for national defense, Congress authorized the use of any kind
of contract the Secretary might deem necessary. This statute, however,
prohibited the use of the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of con-
tracting, but, at the same time, specifically authorized the use of the
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. This statute was followed on December
18, 1941, with the first War Powers Act." Under this Act, the president
was authorized to enter into contracts without regard to the provisions
of the existing law. The authority was delegated by Executive Order
and, as a result, during World War II numerous contracts were
negotiated, many new types of contracts were conceived of and used,
contracts were amended without consideration other than that of the
necessity of the facilitation of the prosecution of the war and the cost-
plus-a-fixed-fee system of contracting was fostered and developed.35
29 Supra note 17.
30 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV, 1959-62); United States v. Warne, 190 F. Supp. 645
(N.D. Cal. 1960) ; I McBride & Wachtel, Government Contracts § 9.10 (1963).
31 40 Stat. 182 (1917).
32 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 12.
33 54 Stat. 712 (1940).
34 55 Stat. 838 (1941).
35 Exec. Order No. 9001, 6 Fed, Reg. 6787 (1941) was issued under the authority of
the First War Powers Act. So also was Exec. Order No. 10210, 16 Fed, Reg. 1049
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With the close of World War II, Congress held hearings for the
purpose of considering government contract problems. These hearings
resulted in the passage of the Armed Services Procurement Act of
1947." This legislation, it was stated, was enacted for the purpose
of a return to normal purchasing procedures through the advertising
bid method on the part of the armed services; of review and revision
of the exceptions to Section 3709 of the Revised Statutes in light of
World War II experience; of making uniform all laws and rules
covering purchase procedures for the armed services; of repealing
many obsolete and diverse laws; of putting within the framework of
one law almost a century's accumulation of statutes and of in-
corporating new safeguards designed to eliminate abuses."
In 1956 the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 was re-
pealed, and its provisions re-enacted, with some changes, as a part of
Title 10 of the United States Code." Since that time, the Act has been
amended on a number of occasions, some of which have been referred
to above."
Earlier Congress had enacted the Federal Property and Ad-
ministrative Services Act of 1949." This statute provided for the
organization of the General Services Administration and gave to it
certain powers over the management of government property within
the United States and the disposition of surplus property, and es-
tablished a detailed procedure for the purpose of facilitating the
procurement of supplies and services by executive departments other
than the armed services. The Act was passed by Congress for the
express purpose of substantially meeting the recommendations made
by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government in its report on the organization and management of
federal supply activities, that legislation be enacted to apply the
principles of the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947 to buying
by all government agencies."
(1951). By 72 Stat. 972 (1958), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1435 (Supp. IV, 1959-
62), Congress enacted the Contract Adjustment Act and extended the First War
Powers Act with modifications. The President delegated the powers to defense agencies
by Exec. Order No. 10789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 (1958). Armed Services Procurement
Regulations (ASPR) and Federal Procurement Regulations (FPR) contain implementing
regulations.
36 62 Stat. 21 (1948).
37 S. Rep. No. 571, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1947) ; H. Rep. No. 109, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1947).
38 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2314, 2381, 2383 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2306,
2310-2311 (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
39 Supra note 28.
49 63 Stat. 377 (1949), 5 U.S.C. §§ 630-630(h), 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-475, 41 U.S.C.
§§ 251-260 (1958).
41 H. Rep. No. 670, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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Provisions of the Armed Services Procurement Act" and
the Federal Procurement Act" are similar, excepting as to ap-
plicability. The former is applicable to the Departments of the Navy,
Army, Air Force and Coast Guard and to the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, and covers the purchase and contract to
purchase by such agencies of all services and all property other than
land, including contracts for the installation and alteration thereof.
The Federal Procurement Act is applicable to purchases and con-
tracts for property or services made by the General Services Adminis-
tration and by any other executive agency (excepting those covered
by the Armed Services Procurement Act) "in conformity with
authority to apply such provisions delegated by the Administrator in
his discretion.' It is to be noted, however, that the General Services
Administrator still retains his authority, subject only to the authority
granted to the military agencies by the Armed Services Procurement
Act, to prescribe policies and methods of procurement and supply
of personal property and non-personal services for all government
agencies." This has been construed to mean that the Administrator
may specify standard government forms and clauses and federal
specifications and standards. Thus, Section 1-1.004 of the Federal
Procurement Regulations, issued by the Administrator of General
Services under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949, of which the Federal Procurement Act is a part, states
that, except for standard government forms and clauses and federal
specifications and standards, the regulations are not mandatory on
the Department of Defense. It is also to be noted that these two pro-
curement statutes leave unaltered those statutes prescribing contract
clauses or provisions to be inserted in specified types of government
contracts."
Generally, the Armed Services Procurement Act and the Federal
Procurement Act are similar. They provide, generally as follows:
(1) That a fair proportion of the purchases and contracts made
be placed with small business."
(2) That purchases of and contracts for property and services
42 10 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2314 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2306, 2310-2311
(Stapp. IV, 1959-62).
45 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1958).
44 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 252 (1958). It must be noted that this delegation
is discretionary. It must be assumed, therefore, that unless other special statutory
authority can be found in appropriations acts or otherwise, that agencies not having
such authority are limited to procurement under 41 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6a, 13 (1958), from
*which agencies having the authority delegated by the General Services Administration
are exempt. See also, 63 Stat. 397 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 260 (1958).
45 63 Stat. 383 (1949), 40 U.S.C. § 481 (a) (1) (1958).
46 Supra note 13.
47 10 U.S.C. § 2301 (1958) ; 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 252(b) (1958).
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be made by formal advertising, but that under certain circumstances
and conditions such purchases and contracts may be negotiated by the
agency head without advertising. These stated circumstances and
conditions are itemized in the statute." In the case of the Armed
Services Procurement Act there are seventeen exceptions. In the case of
the Federal Procurement Act there are fourteen exceptions. In both sta-
tutes the last exception leaves the door open to negotiations otherwise
authorized by law." For the purposes, however, of the Walsh-Healey
Act," the Contract Work-Hour Standards Ace' and Title 40, Sections
276a to 276a-5, all negotiated contracts are to be treated as if they were
made with formal advertising.
(3) Whenever formal advertising is required, the advertisement
must be made a sufficient time previous to the purchase or contract
and the specifications and invitation must be so prepared as to permit
full and free competition."
(4) The head of an agency in negotiating a contract may use
any type of contract which he considers will promote the best interests
of the United States, except that the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost
type of contract may not be used; every negotiated contract must
contain a covenant against contingent fees; no cost contract, cost-plus-
a-fixed-f ee-contract, or incentive contract may be used unless the head
of an agency determines that such contract is likely to be less expensive
than any other kind of a contract or that it is impracticable to obtain
the property or services of the kind or quality required except under
such a contract. The fixed-fee in cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts is
limited to ten per cent of the estimated cost except in experimental,
development or research contracts where the limitation is fifteen
per cent, and to six per cent of the estimated cost of the work or project
in the case of architectural and engineering service contracts for public
works. Every cost or cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract must provide for
notice to the agency by the contractor of every proposed cost-plus-a-
fixed-fee subcontract, or of every proposed fixed-price subcontract
involving more than $25,000.00 or five per cent of the estimated cost
of the prime contract, to be entered into under the prime contract.
48 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1958); 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. 252(c) (1958). The
1962 amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (Supp. IV,
1959-62), supra note 28, requires formal advertising in all cases in which it is feasible and
practicable under the existing circumstances and conditions, and the use of negotiation is
permitted only if formal advertising is not feasible and practicable and if the agency head
finds and determines that the circumstances and conditions of one of the 17 exceptions
exist and in the manner and form specified by 10 U.S.C. § 2310 (1958), as amended, 10
U.S.C. § 2310 (Stipp. IV, 1959-62).
49 Congress has thus left the door open to special exceptions.
99 49 Stat. 2305 (1936), 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1958).
51 76 Stat. 357 (1962), 40 U.S.C. §§ 328-332 (1958), as amended, 40 U.S.C. §§ 328-
332 (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
52 10 U.S.C. § 2305 (1958); 63 Stat. 395 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 253 (1958).
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Every negotiated contract must contain a provision making the con-
tractor's records with respect to the contract available for audit by
the Comptroller General or by his authorized representative for a
period of three years after final payment."
(5) Agency heads may make advance, partial, progress or other
payments under contracts for property or services of an amount not
in excess of the unpaid contract price upon the furnishing of adequate
security."
(6) Agency heads may delegate functions and assign respon-
sibilities relating to procurement. 55
 The responsibility for making
certain findings and determinations as to the circumstances justifying
the use of negotiation instead of formal advertising and the use of the
cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract may be delegated by the agency
head, subject to his direction." Most of the findings and determinations
authorized must be in writing, must follow the form prescribed by the
statute, must be kept in the agency for six years and a copy must be
forwarded to the General Accounting Office with each contract to
which it applies."
(7) Upon recommendation of the head of an agency, the Comp-
troller General may remit all or part, as he considers just and equit-
able, of any liquidated damages assessed for delay in the performance
of a contract that contains a liquidated damages clause."
(8) A prime contractor or any subcontractor is required to
submit cost or pricing data in connection with the negotiation of con-
tracts where the price is expected to exceed $100,000. This cost or
pricing data is to be in the form of a Certificate of Current Pricing, and
the contract is to contain a clause providing for an adjustment in the
contract price, if the certificate proves to be inaccurate, incomplete or
noncurrent.'
Under the authority granted to agency heads by these statutory
provisions, and under the general authority of Section 22 of Title 5,
61 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (Supp. IV, 1959-62);
10 U.S.C. § 2313 (1958); 63 Stat. 395 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 254 (1958). Note that 63
Stat. 395 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 254 (1958) requires provision for GAO audit; 10 U.S.C.
§ 2313 (1958) requires provision for both Agency and GAO audit.
54 63 Stat. 388 (1949), 40 U.S.C. § 485 (1958); 10 U.S.C. § 2307 (1958). Note that
the latter also permits the insertion in bid solicitations limiting such payments to small
business concerns.
55 10 U.S.C. § 2308 (1958); 63 Stat. 396 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 257(6) (1958).
56 10 U.S.C. 	 2311 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2311 (Supp. IV, 1959-62);
63 Stat. 396 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 257 (1958).
57 10 G.S.C. § 2310 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2310 (Supp. IV, 1959-62) ; 63
Stat. 396 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 257 (1958).
58 10 U.S.C. § 2312 (1958) ; 64 Stat. 591 (1950), 41 U.S.C. § 256a , (1958).
66 10 U.S.C. § 2306(1) (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 2306(f) (Supp. IV,
1959-62).
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United States Code, procurement regulations have been issued. The
Department of Defense has issued the Armed Services Procurement
Regulations, which are generally known as ASPR. The General
Services Administration has issued the Federal Procurement Regula-
tions, which are known as FPR, and supplemental regulations ap-
plicable to its procurement activities. The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration has issued the NASA Procurement Regulations.
In addition, the Defense agencies have issued supplemental regulations.
'The Navy regulations are known as the Navy Procurement Directives,
or NPD. The Army regulations are known as the Army Procurement
Procedures, or APP. The Air Force regulations are known as the Air
Force Procurement Instructions, or AFPI. The Defense Supply
Agency has issued regulations known as the Defense Supply Agency
Regulations, or DSPR. Procurement regulations have also been issued
by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Federal Aviation Agency, the
Veterans Administration, the Department of Agriculture, the Coast
Guard and the Corps of Engineers."
The Armed Services Procurement Regulations and the Federal
Procurement Regulations set forth in considerable detail the procure-
ment policies and procedures applicable to government contracting
within the framework of the basic statutes. They specify general
policies, prescribe procurement responsibility and authority, direct
types of procurement activity, regulate the types of contracts to be
used, specify the contract forms and clauses, including those which are
required by statute, by Executive Order, by the General Services
Administration and by the regulations, prescribe the form of other
contract clauses to be used when applicable, establish principles for
the determination of cost and cover other matters such as disputes,
renegotiation, foreign purchases, patents, copyrights, bonds, insurance,
taxes, labor, government property, inspection and acceptance and ex-
traordinary contract actions. These regulations, covering, as they do,
the major portion of government contracting activity, constitute a com-
prehensive code of government contracting. No contracting officer and
no government contractor can enter into, by negotiation or otherwise,
nor administer, a government contract without constant reference to
these regulations. They probably have the force and effect of law."
In any event they control virtually all government contracting activi-
ties.
60 These regulations are supplemental but also cover special procurement authority
and activities.
61 G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, motion for rehearing
denied, 320 F.2d 345 (Ct. Cl. 1963). This case held that validly issued military procure-
ment regulations (ASPR) have the full force and effect of federal law, even to the
extent of overriding inconsistent state legislation, citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S.
245 (1963).
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TYPES OF CONTRACTS
A study or analysis of the types of contracts used by the government
within the framework of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations,
the Federal Procurement Regulations and the basic statutes can only
be made with a full understanding that, regardless of the type of con-
tract used, certain clauses must be inserted in all contracts, either by
law or the regulations, and that certain contracts must follow the form
specified by FPR and/or ASPR. The following analysis is made with-
out reference to these forms or clauses, but must be read with the
realization that in most cases they affect the form of the contract
and have an effect upon the terms, conditions and performance
thereof."
FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS
The firm fixed-price or lump sum contract is a contract under the
terms of which the contractor undertakes to furnish designated prop-
erty or services at a specified price which is not subject to adjustment
by reason of variation in the performance costs." It is the most
preferred type because the contractor accepts full contract cost
responsibility and the relationship between cost control and profit is
established at the time of the award or execution of the contract."
This type of contract must generally be employed when the formal
advertising-bid method of procurement is employed. This is true be-
cause the use of any other method would make it generally impossible
to determine who was the low bidder within the meaning of the
statute." This type of contract is also preferred whenever negotiation
is authorized and a sound estimate of the cost of performance can be
made at the time of negotiation.
Because of the fact that the firm fixed-price contract calls for
delivery in the future of property or services at a price agreed upon
at the time of the award or execution of the contract, contractors tend
to protect themselves against contingencies by including in their bids
or estimates allowances for such contingencies. For this reason, escala-
tion clauses are sometimes used both in the formally advertised contract
62 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 7.100-7.604.4 (Supp. 1963), as amended by scattered parts of
28 Fed. Reg. (1963), and FPR, 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-7.100-1-7.602-3 (1963) detail the required
contract clauses. When dealing with the agencies, the implementing regulations should be
examined for special treatment of particular clauses. Clauses which are cross-referenced
in the cited section of ASPR and FPR will be found in other sections. E.g., Termination,
Proprietary Data, Labor, etc.
63 10 § 2304(c) (1958) and 63 Stat. 393 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 252(e)
(1958) exempt contracts for the erection, repair or furnishing of public buildings or
public improvements. Contracts for those purposes are covered by special statutes and
regulations. This discussion does not include the construction contract.
04 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3-402(b) (Supp. 1963); FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.402(6) (1963).
05 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1958). See, Navy Contract Law § 7.3 (2d ed. 1959).
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and in the negotiated contract. These escalation clauses are specified by
ASPR" to the extent applicable, and by FPR." Under certain cir-
cumstances a different form may be used if these forms do not serve the
purpose. In the case of the formally advertised contract, however, the
regulations make it clear that the escalation clause shall have a ceiling
identical for all bidders so that each bidder is afforded an equal op-
portunity to bid on the escalation basis. In the case of the negotiated
fixed-price contract there need not be such a ceiling and an escalation
clause may be used, under the terms of which the price is adjusted
during or after performance.
Therefore, within the general description set forth above, fixed-
price contracts may provide for payment over and above the fixed price
upon the happening of a defined contingency such as increases in taxes
or in the cost of labor and materials. These provisions, however, are
frequently balanced by corresponding reduction in the price in the
event that the contingency reduces the cost of performance. It is to
be noted, however, that once these provisions for escalation are used,
the contract loses its character as an unequivocal undertaking by the
contractor to deliver the property or services called for by the contract
at a fixed price.
MAXIMUM FIXED-PRICE CONTRACTS
It becomes obvious under the circumstances described above that
there comes a point in price escalation at which the use of the formal
advertising-bid procedure is not available because it is impossible to
obtain bids on a firm-price basis, even though some escalation is al-
lowed. In those cases, if an exception to the advertising-bid require-
ment is available, contracting officers frequently employ the Request
for Proposal or Request for Quotation method of negotiating a con-
tract. When it becomes apparent that the lowest fixed price obtainable
on a negotiation basis is greater than the contracting officer is willing to
accept, or that a reasonably accurate estimate of the cost of the
performance of the work cannot be made, the "maximum-fixed-price"
or "fixed-price-with-redetermination-downward" type of contract is
used. This type of contract provides for an initial fixed price which
represents only the maximum price which the government may be re-
quired to pay, regardless of what the contractor's costs may prove to
be. Such contracts provide, however, that if the contractor's cost ex-
perience, ordinarily based upon partial performance of the work,
indicates that the maximum price is excessive, the government is
entitled to a price reduction.
This price reduction or redetermination is ordinarily determinable
06 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.106, 28 Fed. Reg. 2100 (1963)
67 FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.403-2 (1963).
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at a stated point in the performance of the work, which, under the
regulations, may be after completion of a specified percentage of the
work, of a specified number of units or at a specified date. At this
point in the contract performance, the contract requires the parties to
redetermine the contract price on the basis of actual costs incurred
and estimated costs to be incurred in completing the contract.
There are two schools of thought as to the point in performance
when price redetermination should take place. The Department of the
Navy has always taken the position that redetermination should take
place promptly in order that the contractor will not be guaranteed its
costs, within the maximum, and thus be able to proceed with little risk
and an insured profit. This position also proceeds upon the theory that
if price redetermination is made after the contract is completed, it
becomes completely retroactive, and, therefore, brings the contract
pricing within the realm of the prohibited cost-plus-a-percentage-of-
cost contract. The Department of the Army has always taken the posi-
tion that price redetermination should be deferred as long as possible
in order to give the government the maximum benefit of the contractor's
actual cost experience." Subject to the limitations therein set forth,
ASPR authorize prospective and retroactive price redetermination."
The retroactive price redetermination clause is, however, limited to
procurement for research and development at an estimated cost of
$100,000 or less. 7° FPR contain no provisions authorizing price re-
determination clauses as such, although escalation clauses are author-
ized."
In general, price redetermination is accomplished under the terms
of the redetermination article or clause inserted in the contract by
negotiation. The contractor is required, after the redetermination stage
has been reached, to submit to the contracting officer cost breakdowns,
and in the case of prospective price redetermination, estimates of costs
expected to be incurred in the completion of the contract. On the basis
of this information and any other information available to the parties,
an attempt is made to agree upon a redetermined price, it being the
intent of the price redetermination article to arrive at a price which is
fair and reasonable both to the contractor and to the government.
Failure to agree upon a redetermined price is a dispute within the
meaning of the Standard Disputes Article inserted in all government
68 National Electronics Labs., Inc. v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 308, 180 F. Supp.
337 (1960). The Court of Claims held that completely retroactive price redetermination
did not violate the prohibition against the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost type of con-
tracting.
69 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. §§ 3.404-6, 3.404-7 (Supp. 1963), as amended, 28 Fed, Reg.
4883 (1963).
16 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.404-7(c) (Supp. 1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 4883
(1963).
71 FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.403-2 (1963).
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contracts. The contracting officer is therefore required to make his
decision as to the redetermined price in writing, from which decision
the contractor may appeal to the head of the agency concerned.
FLEXIBLE FIXED-PRICE CONTRACT
Occasionally, a contractor may not be willing to obligate itself
to perform a fixed-price redeterminable contract within a maximum
price. The costs may be so uncertain and indefinite that the contractor
is not willing to accept the risk of incurring costs in excess of the
maximum price. In such cases, if the general fixed-price type of con-
tract is still preferred, the government may, and sometimes does, use
a redetermination clause by the terms of which the fixed-price is sub-
ject to redetermination at a specified point, either upward or downward,
as may be appropriate, upon review of the contractor's actual cost
experience and other repricing data. In these contracts, a price ceiling,
above the fixed price, is established. The redetermined contract price
may not in any event exceed the price ceiling. From a practical stand-
point, this contract operates very much as does the maximum-fixed-
price contract with the exception that the redetermined price may be
greater than the original price specified in the contract. In any event,
it seems to be a practicable negotiation vehicle in those cases where
there is great uncertainty as to the cost of performance.
While this type of contract is authorized by ASPR,72 some agencies
frown upon its use.
FIXED-PRICE-INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
From the foregoing it can readily be seen that the availability of
various types of contracts is in itself a technique of negotiation.
From the standpoint of the government the worst type of contract is
one like the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost contract, under which the
allowance for profit is increased as the cost of performance increases.
The best form of contract is the one which gives the contractor the
greatest incentive to reduce costs. The firm fixed-price contract gives
the contractor such an incentive, but in such a case the government does
not share in the resulting saving of cost. The maximum-price con-
tract provides some incentive to reduce costs, since the negotiator may
allow a greater sum for profit in the redetermination of the price. How-
ever, reducing the base against which profit is customarily measured
diminishes the overall profit so that the incentive (if any) to reduce
costs in this type of contract is slight. To meet this problem, the fixed-
price-incentive contract was devised.73 In the negotiation of a fixed-
price contract, price is about the only thing left open and the
72 ASPR, 32 C.P.A. § 3.404-6(a) (Supp. 1963).
73 Navy Contract Law (2d ed. 1959).
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contracting officer needs negotiating tools to meet the objections of
contractors to the acceptance of contract prices fixed so low as to
increase the risk of loss. The fixed-price-incentive contract is such
a tool.
The fixed-price-incentive contract can only be used when a
realistic estimate can be made of the cost of the performance of the
contract. Upon the basis of this estimate, a firm target cost is agreed
upon to which a reasonable allowance for profit, the target profit, is
added. The sum of these two items constitutes the target price. A price
ceiling is then determined. The contract provides that if the final cost
of performance of the contract is exactly equal to the estimated target
cost the contractor shall receive the target profit. If the final cost is
less than the target cost, the contractor shares the cost saving on the
basis of the previously negotiated percentages of the target cost and
target profit. The contractor thereby benefits by receiving a larger
profit while the government benefits from a lower total contract price.
If the final cost of performance is greater than the target cost, the
contractor's profit is reduced by the previously negotiated percentage.
If the final cost is equal to the ceiling price, the contractor makes no
profit and if it exceeds the ceiling price, the contractor absorbs the
loss.
An alternate form of this type of contract is based upon the
negotiation of an initial price and a production point of some time
prior to delivery or completion of the first item. At the production point
a firm target cost, target profit, final profit, the price formula and
price ceiling are negotiated. This permits the establishment of some
basis for a realistic estimate of the cost of performance prior to the
fixing of the target cost, target profit and ceiling price.
Under this type of contract, final cost and profit are determined
by negotiation and agreement after completion of the work, and the
final contract price is evidenced by supplemental agreement or
amendment executed by the parties. If the parties cannot agree upon
the final costs, profit and price, the dispute is treated as one within the
Standard Disputes Article and is subject to the disputes appeals
procedure set forth therein
COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACT
The cost-reimbursement contract provides for payment to the
contractor of those costs which are defined as "allowable" and in-
curred in the performance of the contract, to the extent prescribed in
the contract. This type of contract establishes an estimated total cost
for the purposes of obligation of funds and establishing a ceiling which
the contractor may not exceed. This ceiling is, of course, subject to
amendment from time to time by agreement. These contracts generally
3 5
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provide that if the contractor exceeds the cost prior to an amendment
increasing the total estimated cost, the costs incurred in the interim will
be reimbursable as if the ceiling had been increased prior to the incur-
rence thereof."
This type of contract is used only when the uncertainties involved
in the performance of the contract do not permit an estimate of cost
with sufficient reasonableness to permit the use of any type of fixed-
price contract. Of course, it can be used only in the case of negotiation.
By its very nature it cannot be used for the formal advertising-bid
contract.
The cost-reimbursement contract is particularly used in the case
of procurements involving substantial amounts, as the necessary cost
of record keeping on the part of the contractor and the necessary audits
of costs on the part of the government make it uneconomical to use
it in small contracts. Note also that it can only be used after determina-
tion is made that the method of contracting is likely to be less costly
than other methods, and that it is impracticable to secure supplies or
services of the kind or quality required as provided by statute."
There are four different types of cost-reimbursement contracts.
The first of these is the cost contract under which the contractor
recovers only allowable costs and receives no fee. The second of these
is the cost-sharing contract under which the contractor receives no fee
and is reimbursed only for an agreed percentage of his allowable costs.
This type of contract is used for procurements which cover production
or research projects that are jointly sponsored by the government and
the contractor with benefit to the contractor in lieu of full monetary
reimbursable costs. Frequently, these contracts are used in jointly
sponsored research and development work with non-profit educational
institutions or organizations and in cases where the results of the con-
tract may have commercial benefit to a private contractor.
The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract is a cost-reimbursable contract
which provides for the payment of a fixed fee to the contractor. In this
respect, it differs from the prohibited cost-plus-percentage-of-cost con-
tract in that the fee is fixed, definite and certain in amount. It fre-
quently happens in such contracts, however, that there are changes
made under the Standard Changes Clause applicable to government
contracts which result in an increase in the estimated cost and a cor-
responding negotiated increase in the fixed fee.
The cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract avoids the evils of a cost-plus-
a-percentage-of-cost contract. The contractor does not benefit by in-
74 This type of contract has led to numerous claims by contractors for the
recovery of costs incurred in excess of cost ceilings or limitations. See, for example,
Thiokol Chem. Corp., A.S.B.C.A. No. 5726, 60-2 B.C.A. If 2852 (1960).
75 10	 § 2306 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. §§ 2306(a), (f) (Supp. IV, 1959-
62) ; 63 Stat. 395 (1949), 41 U.S.C. § 254 (1958).
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creasing the cost of performing the contract. However, this type of
contract offers no encouragement to the contractor to reduce its costs.
Because of the dangers that surround the use of this type of contract,
contracting officers have attempted to use other devices to encourage
contractors to control their costs. It is to be noted, however, that be-
cause of the regard with which the advertising-bid method of govern-
ment procurement is held, the General Accounting Office and Congress
tend to review cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts carefully and to question
the legality as well as the appropriateness of the method used." In
addition, the statutory safeguards requiring the determinations referred
to above are indicative of Congressional reluctance to permit the use
of this type of contract. It would appear, however, that there are many
situations such as those involving the so-called "concept of concur-
rency" adopted by the Department of the Air Force in connection with
the establishment of missile bases, which require the use of this type
of contract.
For these reasons, contracting officers have sought methods to
improve the cost-reimbursement contract and provide some incentive
on the part of the contractor to control cost. The cost-plus-incentive-fee
contract is the result of these efforts.
The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract contains provisions for a fee
which is adjusted by formula in accordance with the relationship which
total allowable costs bear to target costs. A target cost is negotiated
initially, together with a target fee, a minimum and maximum fee and
a fee adjustment formula. Upon completion of the contract, the fee
payable to the contractor is determined in accordance with the formula.
The formula provides for increases in the fee above the target fee
when total allowable costs are less than target costs, and decreases
in the fee below target fee when total allowable costs exceed target
costs. These adjustments in fee, however, can never reduce the
fee below the minimum or increase the fee above the maximum
specified in the contract. ASPR and PPR?"' provide for the use of this
type of contract where a cost-reimbursement contract is found to be
necessary (based upon the findings required by the basic statutes),
where there is a possibility that its use will result in lower costs to the
government and where the formula negotiated provides the con-
tractor with a positive profit incentive for effective cost management
and control.
These contracts, providing for reimbursement to the contractor
of "allowable" costs, bring into play by their terms the provisions
of ASPR and FPR," both of which, under the title "Cost Principles",
78 Dees. Comp. Gen., No. B-120456 (1958) (unpublished).
77 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. / 3.405-4 (Supp. 1963); FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.404-4 (1963).
78 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. $§ 15.000-15.603 (Supp. 1963); FPR, 41 C.F.R. 1§ 1-15.000-1-
15.603 (1963).
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define allowable costs. Disputes concerning allowable costs fall within
the disputes-appeals procedure of the Standard Disputes Article re-
quired to be inserted in government contracts.
TIME AND MATERIAL CONTRACTS
The time and material contract substitutes for fixed-price payment
provisions, provisions for the payment of the cost of materials fur-
nished and for payment of all direct labor furnished at fixed hourly,
daily or weekly rates. These rates include direct and indirect' labor,
overhead and profit.°
The usual form of the time and material contract provides for
payment on the basis of applying the specified or scheduled time rates
to the number of direct labor hours performed.° This type of contract
is used only where it is not possible at the time of the placing of the
contract to estimate the extent or duration of the work or to anticipate
costs with any degree of confidence. 81 The regulations caution the con-
tracting officer with reference to the use of the contract, since its na-
ture does not encourage effective management control. He is also
warned that it is essential that this type of contract be used only where
provision is made for adequate controls including appropriate sur-
veillance by government personnel during performance to give reason-
able assurance that inefficient and wasteful methods are not being used.
This type of contract does have distinct advantages, however, where
the work to be performed under the terms of the contract requires
either direct supervision or periodic orders for the performance of
specified types of work, such as in the case of the repair, alteration, and
maintenance of equipment.
The problems of administering this type of contract, however,
involve auditing of labor hours performed and determination that all
of the hours charged were reasonable. A problem is also presented in
connection with the replacement of parts or materials which are not in
accordance with specifications, and the correction of defective or
inferior workmanship. The only regulations with respect to contract
provisions covering inspection and replacement of defective materials
or workmanship are those presently set forth in AFPI. 82 These provi-
sions leave much to be desired in the draftsmanship. As they directly
affect the determination of the ultimate contract price, the ambiguities
79 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.406-1 (Supp. 1963); FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.405-1 (1963);
Navy Contract Law § 7.12 (2d ed. 1959).
82 See, for example, Geotechnical Corp., A.S.B.C.A. Nos. 6221-6223, 61 B.C.A.¶ 3195 (1961); Rocky Mountain Mach. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 3719, 56-2 B.C.A. ri 1135
(1956) ; Lewis Motor Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 7435, 62 B.C.A. 3285 (1962).
81 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.406-1(b) (Supp. 1963); FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.405-1(b)
(1963).
82 AFPI, 32 C.F.R. §§ 1014.000-1014.204 (1960).
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contained therein are at present the subject of consideration by the
ASPR Committee, which considers and proposes amendments to the
regulations. The pending proposal, which would add a new part to
section VII of ASPR and would specify uniform clauses for use in
time and material contracts, is being considered by the Committee as
a part of its current effort to reduce inconsistent coverage in the "sub-
sidiary procurement regulations of the military departments (APP,
NPD, AFPI, DSPI)."" The new part proposes an inspection clause
for use in time and material contracts which would require correction
or replacement of faulty materials or defective workmanship at a time
rate reduced so as to eliminate profit. Otherwise, the contractor would
be paid full time rates for all direct labor hours performed.
THE LABOR-HOUR CONTRACT
The labor-hour contract is a variance of the time and materials
contract, differing only in that materials are not involved in the con-
tract or are not supplied by the contractor. Its use is limited to a deter-
mination that no other type of contract will suitably serve. Because of
the fact that this type of contract, like the time and material con-
tract, provides no incentive to the contractor to manage his labor force
effectively, its use is limited.
OTHER TYPES OF CONTRACTS
Because of some success in lowering overall contract performance
costs by incentives, the regulations encourage the use of incentives in
all types of contracts. Thus, in ASPR" it is pointed out that in addition
to profit incentives to control costs there are other means of providing
incentives to contractors to obtain extra management attention and
effort. Accordingly, it is suggested to contracting officers that per-
formance incentives with profit awards may be used in almost any
type of contract. A contract with a performance incentive is defined as
one which incorporates an incentive to the contractor to surpass stated
performance targets by providing for increases in the fee or profit to
the extent that such targets are surpassed and for decreases to the
extent that such targets are not met. As this is not exactly a type of
contract, but provides a method for an increase or decrease in profit
in a fixed-price contract, it will not be discussed here in detail. Its
concept, however, is available to the reader in ASPR."
There is also what is known as the "letter contract". It is defined
by ASPR and FPR" as a written, preliminary contractual instrument
83 Letter From Graeme C. Bannerman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Procurement) to the National Security Industrial Association, April 26, 1963.
81 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.407 (Supp. 1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 2577 (1963).
85 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.407-2 (Supp. 1963).
83 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.408 (Supp. 1963); FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.405-3 (1963).
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which authorized immediate commencement of manufacture of sup-
plies, or performance of services, including, but not limited to, pre-
production planning and the procurement of necessary materials. It is
to be used, however, only when the interests of national defense demand
that the contractor be given a binding commitment prior to formaliza-
tion of a contract so that the work can be commenced immediately, and
where the negotiation of the definitive contract in sufficient time to
meet procurement needs is not possible. Letter contracts must be con-
verted to formal bilateral contracts. They generally contain, however,
appropriate references to applicable statutory requirements, determina-
tions and clauses—including a termination clause to be used in the
event that a definitive contract cannot be mutually agreed upon. They
are, however, true contracts and therefore must comply with all of
the statutory and regulatory requirements if they are to have binding
effect. They are not considered satisfactory contractual documents.
Another type of contract is the purchase order, designed to
simplify and expedite procurements of standard commercial supplies
and services not in excess of $2,500. This is one of the exceptions to
the formal advertising requirements. These purchase orders are ad-
dressed to the selected supplier and signed only by the contracting
officer. Like most purchase orders they do not by their terms require
or contemplate the supplier's acceptance, but merely require ac-
ceptance by performance. The purchase order is an offer by the govern-
ment of a unilateral contract; in short the government's promise for
the supplier's act."
A convenient device, other than the purchase order for shortcutting
procurement, is the "open-end" type of contract, sometimes referred
to as the master or indefinite delivery type of contract. This type
of contract may or may not be a fixed-price contract. It is authorized by
ASPR and FPR." It constitutes an agreement between the contractor
and the government as to the terms and conditions under which the
contractor will perform orders, sometimes called task or job orders,
which may be issued by the government from time to time during the
contract period. This type of contract includes all applicable con-
tract provisions, except price, quantity and time and place of deliveries,
although sometimes price may be specified. It is used to avoid the
preparation and execution of a series of similar contracts and some-
times is used for decentralization of procurement. When this type of
contract binds the contractor without its further consent to perform
orders placed by the government, this tends to establish an assured
source of supply, and, when price is specified, it assures a firm price
with respect to future procurements.
87 Navy Contract Law § 7.15 (2d ed. 1959).
88 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.409 (Supp. 1963); PPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.405-5 (1963).
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Sometimes these contracts specify a minimum amount of the sup-
plies or services to be ordered by the government during the contract
period. As the government, in its discretion, has the right under this
type of contract to refrain from placing any orders, the agreement
might be considered objectionable on the ground that either there is
no consideration for the government's promise or that the agreement
is too indefinite to be enforced." The government, however, takes the
view that these contracts are enforceable."
The problems surrounding the use of the open-end type contract
are sometimes resolved by the use of the indefinite quantity open-end
contract. This type of contract is similar to the master open-end con-
tract, except that it specifies a minimum and a maximum quantity of
supplies or services to be purchased or sold. This type of contract,
having the aspects of a fixed-price contract, can be the subject of the
formal advertising-bid method of procurement.
The requirements type of open-end contract is similar to the
indefinite quantity open-end contract, except that it only obligates the
government to order under the contract all of a specified government
activity's requirements for the supplies or services that arise during the
period covered by the contract. As a protection against the extremes
of ordering, these contracts generally contain provisions exempting
the contractor from furnishing orders for less than a minimum quan-
tity or value and a maximum quantity or value. This type of contract
is widely used by the Federal Supply Service of the General Services
Administration, in the procurement of standard commercial supplies
and services for all federal agencies.
From the foregoing, it would appear that one of the major pur-
poses of the open-end form of contract is to facilitate the placing of
multiple contracts with single suppliers for essentially similar supplies
or services. A variation of this form of contract is the "Basic Agree-
ment" described in ASPR and FPR 9 1
 However, the Basic Agreement,
standing alone, cannot be considered a contract. It is limited in scope
to a written understanding negotiated between the government and a
particular supplier as to what contract clauses or general provisions
will be applicable to certain types of negotiated contracts which there-
after may be made between the parties during the term of the Basic
Agreement. This type of agreement is authorized for use when past
experience and future plans indicate that a substantial number of
separate contracts may be entered into with a specific contractor dur-
ing the term of the Basic Agreement and that substantial recurring
89 I Williston on Contracts § 104 nn. 12 & 13 (3d ed. 1957).
00 Navy Contract Law § 7.17 (2d ed. 1959).
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 3.410-1 (Supp. 1963), as amended, 28 Fed. Reg. 2557 (1963);
FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.405-4 (1963).
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negotiation problems exist with reference to a particular contractor.
These contracts are required to provide for termination upon thirty
days written notice by either party. As has been noted herein, however,
with the present status of the standardization of contract clauses au-
thorized or required for use in negotiated fixed-price supply contracts
and the parallel development of ASPR printed forms of contract pro-
visions which include all or substantially all of these clauses, the Basic
Agreement has not been the subject of widespread use.
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